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Utilitarianism and Economic Behavior.  




In spite of the use of a utilitarian language in Rational Choice Theory, economists do 
not acknowledge any link to this current of moral philosophy, and have made great 
efforts to rid economics from its legacy. In this document we aim at assessing these 
efforts retracing their history from Pareto to Samuelson in order to determine how 
close they came to their ideal of formulating a positive science rid of what they called 
any metaphysical traces.
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Utilitarismo y comportamiento económico: 




A pesar del uso del lenguaje utilitarista en la Teoría de la Elección Racional, los 
economistas no sólo no reconocen un legado de esta filosofía moral sino que han 
hecho múltiples esfuerzos para deshacerse de esta herencia. En este documento, 
en un recorrido desde Pareto hasta Samuelson, buscamos evaluar si han logrado su 
cometido, acercándose al ideal de una ciencia positiva, libre de lo que ellos mismos 
denominaban vestigios metafísicos.
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Utilitarianism and Economic Behavior.  Looking for Benthamite Traces
1.  Introduction
The Utilitarian legacy in economic theory and in particular in Rational Choice Theory 
(RCT) is far from clear1. Even if RCT continues using utilitarian expressions in its 
description  of  individual  economic  behavior,  economists  have  tried  very  hard  to 
overcome this philosophical legacy. The attacks coming from psychologists on the 
scientific status of Utilitarian Economics and the criticisms to Utilitarianism made 
economists search for alternative and empirical basis for their approach to individual 
behavior. Historians of economic thought reflect the unsettled state of this legacy not 
only in their direct analysis of the relationship but also in their assessments of the 
connection between economics2 and psychology. In their assessment of the standard 
history, we can find two trends: those who find no link between Classic Utilitarianism 
and the early Marginalists (for example Roncaglia 1999, Warke 2000, Sigot 2001, 
Cohen 2010), and those who see a relationship between hedonism, in particular, or 
psychology, in general, and Marginalism (for example Sent 2004, Bruni & Sugden 
2007, Heukelom 2008, 2010), some even after the Ordinalist Revolution (for example 
Bruni 2010, Hands 2010, 2011).   
According to the standard history, early Marginalists drew inspiration from Utilitarianism 
and hedonism but in their search for empirical foundations, associated with the decline 
of  introspection  as  a  valid  scientific  method,  economists  increasingly  distanced 
themselves from these sources (c.f. Bruni 2010). With the Ordinalist Revolution the link 
between economics and psychology was completely broken, and this move came to 
its end with Paul Samuelson’s Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP 1938). 
The axiom implies there is no need for a theory of human action, be it utilitarian or any 
other, because economics only deals with observed individual choices. This is the 
final step in a research program where economists aimed at leaving the discussion 
and exploration of the motives of action to other disciplines such as psychology (cf. 
Sent 2004, Bruni 2010). This way, economics would be free of all the criticism coming 
from psychology and others arguing Utilitarianism and hedonism were unscientific 
because they did not rely on empirical proof but on introspection3 (cf. Hands 2010). 
1   Even if we use the term economic theory with no further qualification we acknowledge the existence 
of multiple competing economic theories and the diversity within what could be called mainstream 
economic theory. This paper is concerned with the latter and more precisely with RCT. The reason 
why we do not qualify the term is we share a view that is becoming widespread stating that main-
stream economics is characterized by a formal definition which presents economics as a method 
to study social phenomena. The starting point of this method is rational choice theory which links 
economic theory to a theory of action. Such a view can be found in economists as diverse as Mises, 
Robbins, Becker and Gintis, amongst others. 
2   Analyses center on economic theory, and more specifically on consumer choice theory. Here we 
make the direct association with RCT, understood as utility maximizing behavior.  
3   Psychologists, such as William James and William McDougall, argued maximizing rational behavior 
had been largely disproved and could not sustain any scientific endeavor. The criticism was even 
more precise arguing utility was not an observable or measurable object making economics rely on 
a metaphysical entity to explain individual behavior. Echoes of this position can be found in the Insti-
tutionalist critique to neoclassical theory at the end of the XIXth and beginnings of the XXth century, 
and in Pareto and his followers. For a review of these criticisms see Lewin (1996).  4
Thus economics would be free of this unscientific basis and its scientific status could 
be preserved.
This text follows an increasing literature in the history of economic thought which aims 
at providing a reconstruction of the path that leads to this stage of the relationship 
between economic theory and Utilitarianism4. Starting with Jevons, as Bentham’s 
self-avowed heir in economics, it covers the years up to Samuelson’s theorem (1938). 
After Jevons’s attempt to bring utilitarian calculus into economics, Pareto will begin 
the rupture with his ordinal reformulation of utility theory. He will be followed by Hicks 
and Allen and finally Samuelson and Houthakker in 1950 demonstrate the logical 
equivalence between ordinal utility theory and its reformulation in purely observable 
terms5 (Wong 2006). In the text we aim at taking the assessment a step further 
by focusing not on the general association between psychology and economics, 
but on the link between a moral theory such as Utilitarianism and economics. We 
believe that even if the relationship between hedonism and Utilitarianism is widely 
documented, as is the relationship between hedonism and Marginalism, it is possible 
to make a connection between ethics and economics. In other words, beyond the 
connection between psychology and economics, there is an underlying connection 
between economic theory and Benthamite utilitarianism, or even that the connection 
between economics and psychology is possible because of this underlying link with 
Bentham. 
We advance that Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, understood as a theory of action 
based on rational choice, informs the development of economic theory, at least 
during the first half of the XXth century, and thus can be traced in RCT. We suggest 
that retracing the link between Utilitarianism, theory of action and rational choice, 
it is possible to find a consistent and crosswise ethical position in economic theory, 
as it was formulated by some of its major contributors. Following Hands (2010), we 
believe economists were committed to a view of human agency based on free will 
and individual choice, which was originally grounded on mental-state psychology, 
that  at  times  conflicted  with  their  effort  of  formulating  a  theory  “consistent  with 
dominant views of scientific knowledge” (Hands 2010: 642)6. Moreover, contrary to 
a reconstruction recently restated in Bruni (2010), we advance that the connection 
between economic theory and Utilitarianism is not broken when economists retain   
 
4   It differs from Stigler’s (1950a, 1950b) history of Utility theory because he presents a history from 
Adam Smith up to 1950 tracing the notion of marginal utility and the formalization of utility theory 
with no reference to the philosophical background or moral implications of the use of the concept 
and language of utility. It follows the recent reconstructions of the relation between economics and 
psychology more in the line of those who see a connection even after the Ordinalist Revolution (cf. 
Hands 2010, 2011) but connecting it directly with a Utilitarian legacy and not only with a strand of 
psychology.
5   In connecting Pareto with Hicks and Allen and Samuelson we differ from Bruni and Guala (2001) 
who differentiate both movements –ordinalism and operationalism- as two paths to accomplish the 
positivist project in economics (i.e. abandoning all metaphysical elements and founding economic 
theory only on observable and operational concepts). Here we are concerned with the final aim 
which is similar for both paths. 
6   On similar lines, but emphasizing its epistemological consequences, Moscati (2007) reconstructs 
this period following a neo-Kantian epistemology, which allows him to identify a trade-off between 
realism and systematicity. 5
the theoretical structure derived from Utilitarian psychology even if they, allegedly, 
abandon Utilitarian assumptions. The Ordinalist Revolution does not culminate this 
rupture by defining utility as an index of preferences and focusing on choices (Bruni 
2010: 93). Benthamite Utilitarianism is not restricted to cardinal utility, and, as a theory 
of human agency, it deals with individual choice.  
Even if fragmentary, this history allows addressing several issues related to the 
language, object and scope of RCT. In the first place, economic theory still uses 
the language of Utilitarianism arguing it has no content or significance other than 
functional and mathematical. However, it could be asked if it is possible to keep 
a language without its meanings, in particular when there is an avowed failure in 
replacing  the  foundations  of  that  language.  Second,  if  economics  in  its  rational 
choice version is based on individual choices it is, to some important extent, a theory 
of  action  (cf.  Pareto  1971[1906],  Mitchell  1910a,  1910b,  Clark  1918, Allen  1932, 
Baccini 2007, Heukelom 2010). As such, the question is if this theory of action is 
related or not to Utilitarianism. Lastly, following this idea of economics as a theory of 
action, it is possible to ask about the limits of economics in regard, for example, to 
morals. Utilitarianism makes the distinction between economic calculus and ethical 
calculations disappear; if there is a relationship between economics and Utilitarianism 
then the former could pretend to the status of a social philosophy justifying, for 
example, economic imperialism. All these questions may be summed up in a single 
one: How can RCT do without a theory of human action as the one presented by 
Utilitarianism?
We believe this question underlies the history we are trying to retrace in this text; the 
development of the story we are telling suggests that the theory of action underlying 
rational choice theory is utilitarian. Even if economists such as William S. Jevons 
and Francis Y. Edgeworth felt at ease with the close link between Utilitarianism and 
economic theory, other great thinkers held this to be an undesirable relation. Two 
examples of this rejection of the utilitarian influence on economic theory are John 
M. Keynes and Joseph A. Schumpeter. For both a theory of individual action was 
fundamental in economics but neither considered utilitarianism a good alternative. 
Keynes in his My Early Beliefs (1949) clearly expresses his opposition to classical 
utilitarianism7.  In  The  End  of  Laissez  Faire  (1932)  Keynes  also  makes  clear  the 
problems  he  sees  regarding  the  conception  of  human  nature  associated  with 
utilitarianism which supports, especially, money making motives in human behavior 
presenting a maximizing individual8 (cf. Mini 1991). Schumpeter (1954: 409) contends 
that the utilitarian conception of human action is completely wrong unless dealing 
with rational behavior which cannot be taken to be the general behavior found in 
economic activity. According to Schumpeter, there might be an apparent coincidence 
between Utilitarianism and some policy recommendations derived from economic 
theory but it is only in some aspects, and Utilitarianism is, over all, an inappropriate 
foundation for economic analysis.    
7   In this text Keynes also expresses his objections to ascribing rationality to human nature (Keynes 
1949: 101). 
8   An earlier version of this criticism can be found in some representatives of Old Institutionalism such 
as Mitchell (1910a, 1910b), Clark (1918) and Commons (1936).6
The  problematic  relationship  between  Utilitarianism  and  the  theory  of  action  of 
RCT requires reviewing the link between pleasure, utility, preference and choice 
during the different stages of the relationship between economics and hedonism. 
The relation between these terms allows understanding different positions regarding 
the foundations of the conception of human behavior mobilized by economic theory 
during the first half of the XXth century. The quest for the scientific status of economic 
theory explains these different positions and the role given to Utilitarianism. Retracing 
this history is even more relevant nowadays with the increasing acceptance and 
growth of behavioral economics. Utilitarianism might be coming back and leaving the 
backstage of economic theory. 
In  order  to  retrace  how  a  precise  and  fundamental  piece  of  Utilitarianism,  the 
enunciative sense of the utility principle, was incorporated and apparently relegated, 
the text is divided in six parts. In the first, we describe Bentham’s characterization 
of human behavior, and his definition of utility in order to show how he considered 
his theory to be a positive one even if his ultimate intention was reform. Bentham’s 
explicit intention was to make Utilitarianism not only a criterion of moral evaluation but 
also a description of human behavior in order to overcome the arbitrariness he saw in 
other moral systems through what he considered to be solid scientific foundations. In 
the second, we present how this characterization was introduced in economic theory 
especially through the works of John Stuart Mill, William S. Jevons and Francis Y. 
Edgeworth. We then proceed to show how the ordinal revision of utility theory begun 
by Vilfredo Pareto did not really do away with the Utilitarian theory of action. Paul 
Samuelson, as we discuss in section 4, unsuccessfully tried to eliminate this theory. 
In section 5 we hint at what is happening today and in section 6 we conclude. 
2.   Utilitarian Model of Behavior
Jeremy  Bentham’s  view  of  individual  action  characterizes  human  behavior  as  a 
reaction to exterior stimuli producing sensations of pleasure and/or pain (Bentham 
1968[1789]:  1).  In  this  sense,  Bentham  is  elaborating  a  theory  of  action.  This 
characterization  allows  establishing  regularities  in  behavior  that  can  be  readily 
admitted and axiomatized precisely because of its universal acceptance (Bentham 
1968[1789]: 1). There is no need for introspection9 in establishing and accepting 
this characterization of human behavior because, according to Bentham, pleasures 
and pains are the only real entities in that their existence is the object of universal 
and constant experience and they can exist independently from any other entity 
(Bentham 1968 [1817]: 98). This is why, without further justification Bentham posits 
 
9   �ote that Bentham explicitly distances his theory from introspection. This is an important point be-  �ote that Bentham explicitly distances his theory from introspection. This is an important point be-
cause it has been argued that the growing rejection of introspection as a valid scientific method in 
psychology is one of the elements that led economists to mark their distance from Utilitarianism and 
hedonism (cf. Hands 2010). However, Bruni and Sugden (2007: 150-151) qualify this view showing 
that introspection was an accepted method up to the rise of Behavioralism in the second half of the 
XXth century, that is before Pareto’s revision. Introspection then does not seem to be the problem 
in the assuring the scientific status of economic theory at least in the earlier stages of Marginalism 
(cf. Bruni 2010: 101; Hands 2010: 635). Hands (2010: 639-640) also shows that introspection kept 
playing an important role, as evidenced in Lionel Robbins famous 1932 article.   7
his behavioral model as a postulate. More precisely, he establishes – from what he 
claims to be a careful observation of human action- that the ultimate goal of any 
action is the achievement of individual well-being understood as enjoying pleasures 
and avoiding pains. Individuals act motivated by external stimuli which produces 
sensations of pleasure or pain in them. In Bentham’s words:
“Well-being, composed as hath been seen, of the maximum of pleasure minus the 
minimum of pain—the pleasure it will be seen is man’s own pleasure, the pain is man’s 
own pain—will upon a strict and close enquiry be seen to be actually the intrinsic and 
the ultimate object of pursuit to every man at all times.” (Bentham, 1983: 147-148) 
The goal of individual action is well-being: such is the basis of Bentham’s utilitarianism, 
which allows interpreting it as a theory of action10. In their actions, individuals decide 
what course will lead them to their well-being. They choose what course of action 
will provide them most well-being. This definition of human behavior corresponds, 
according to Bentham, to the enunciative sense of the utility principle11. It allows not 
only understanding the mechanism behind individual action but also evaluating such 
action (Bentham 1983 [1817]: 59-60). Through a consequentialist evaluation, it is 
possible to establish if an action is good (i.e. it served its purpose of advancing well-
being) or bad (i.e. it did not contribute to the individuals’ well-being).
Bentham affirms that people react to the objects they encounter experiencing pleasure 
or pain (Bentham 1983 [1817]: 11). Well-being, as a result of the sensitive relation the 
individual has with her environment, is greater when the experience is pleasurable 
and smaller when it is painful. The individual’s sensibility influences this relation 
so the quantity of pleasure or pain she derives from her experiences with objects 
changes according to her own subjective conditions. So even if, as Cohen (2010) 
remarks, there are objective aspects in Bentham’s definition of utility (Bentham 1952: 
101-102), they in no way lessen or change its subjective character. This explains why 
an object can be more valuable for one individual than for another, or even, why the 
object’s value might change for the same individual according to variations in her 
internal and external circumstances. This means that, contrary to Roncaglia’s (1999: 
107) argument, there is an explicit and functional connection in Bentham between 
value in use and value in exchange. Bentham states that value of an object “in the 
way of exchange arises out of, and depends, altogether upon, and is proportioned to, 
its value in the way of use” (Bentham 1952: 108).
10  Marks (2004) argues there is a direct connection between Bentham’s notion of utility, and therefore 
between his theory of action, and psychophysics, a current in psychology that, as will be shown be-
low, was quite influential on early marginalists. Marks (2004: 10-11) argues that as a psychological 
entity utility entails psycophysics because not only does it follow the rule of diminishing returns, it 
also indicates a relation between stimuli and mental states associated with pleasure and pain, which 
have psychological strength.
11  Bentham states the utility principle has two senses: the enunciative sense (i.e. a description of hu- Bentham states the utility principle has two senses: the enunciative sense (i.e. a description of hu-
man behavior as a result of the search of maximum well-being, however the individual might define 
it) and the censorial sense (i.e. a social choice criteria in terms of the greatest happiness) (Bentham 
1968 [1817]: 60). Because this text intends to account for the motive of action in economic theory it 
will only deal with the enunciative sense. However, there is an unbreakable connection between the 
two. We will deal with this in what follows.  8
Moreover, due to this changing relation with their environment, every individual has 
interest in acting in order to obtain more pleasure than pain in each situation (Bentham 
1968 [1789]: 192). Individual action, according to Bentham, implies an intertemporal 
calculation of pleasures and pains such that present decisions take into account the 
anticipation of future pleasures and pains. However, such calculation should not be 
necessarily assimilated to a conscious felicific calculus. Bentham states everyone, 
even a madman calculates (cf. see below), showing the enunciative sense to be a 
description of human behavior that stands as a generalization and rationalization of 
actual behavior.    
Bentham uses the term utility to name well-being because he believes it is a more 
global word than pleasurable, and he uses utilitarian to name his approach because 
it describes the study of human behavior tending to increase pleasure and diminish 
pain. Utility then must not be confused with happiness because while the former 
refers to a mixture of pleasure and pain the latter refers exclusively to pure and intense 
pleasures without pain. Therefore, maximizing utility cannot be taken for maximizing 
happiness as the former can perfectly mean avoiding pain. Furthermore, Bentham 
did not define pleasure or good because “he did not believe it was possible to do 
so” (Goldworth 1972: 335). Pleasure is a real term, even if individually defined, and 
cannot be equalized to interest, desire or want which are fictitious terms. Pleasure 
is a sensation and is the result of a satisfied interest that can be assimilated with 
preferences.  Choice,  interest  and  preference  then  are  supervenient  on  pleasure 
(Goldworth 1972: 342).   
The capacity to calculate, expressed in the calculation of utility, not only makes 
optimization procedures possible, it also gives a norm for action: its adequacy to an 
end. If pleasure and avoidance of pain is a good, any action that aims at this purpose is 
good. Therefore, in Bentham the goodness or badness of an action is not to be judged 
based on its motive but on its adequacy, that is, according to its ability to achieve well-
being. Because we are dealing with the determination of means regarding ends that 
are not in themselves good or bad, understanding the mechanism of individual action 
and evaluating such action is only a matter of calculation. Calculation, according to 
Bentham, is an undeniable capacity every human being possesses:
“When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at stake, and these in 
the highest degree (the only matters, in short, that can be of importance) who is there 
that does not calculate? Men calculate, some with less exactness, indeed, some with 
more: but all men calculate.” (Bentham 1968 [1789]: 173)
In  brief,  Bentham  bases  human  action  on  a  model  of  an  individual  striving  at 
furthering her well-being through the maximization of utility. This model concludes 
that  the  goodness  or  badness  of  an  action  consists  in  its  capacity  to  further 
individual well-being which is the same as saying it depends upon the success of 
the calculation behind the action, or the correct anticipation of the effects of choice 
on well-being. 9
This behavioral model constitutes for Bentham the starting point of science if it is 
accepted that “all knowledge is, in the last analysis, part and parcel of the pursuit 
of  happiness”  (Stark  1952:  19). This  means  that  in  order  to  assess  Bentham’s 
Utilitarianism, one must go beyond the greatest happiness principle, and deal with its 
foundations: the utility principle. The principle contains a description of human action, 
which can also be read as a moral criterion for its evaluation (the enunciative sense), 
and a prescription for the design and implementation of public policy (the censorial 
sense). �o doubt, as mentioned before, Bentham’s aim was social reform. However, 
he believed it could only be done on the basis of scientific knowledge. Thus, it can 
be contended that, the enunciative sense leads to the censorial sense, and that the 
latter has no grounds without the former12. In this sense, Bentham believed that art 
and knowledge are inseparable (Bentham 1952: 81-82). 
Therefore, “the starting point of any science will have to be the potential utility of the 
objects or actions which it sets to investigate” (Stark 1952: 19) because 
“Directly or indirectly, well-being, in some shape or another, or in several shapes, or 
all shapes taken together, is the object of each thought, and object of each action, 
on the part of each known being, who is at the same time, a sensitive and thinking 
being.” (Bentham 1952: 82).
Political  economy,  dealing  with  the  axioms  and  principles  of  subsistence  and 
abundance (Bentham 1952: 93), aims at securing national wealth through other 
means than security and equality, and as such, is a branch of the science of the 
legislator. Science that has no other basis than eudemonics, or the art whose object 
is to contribute to the attainment of well-being and the science which explains how to 
act in order to exercise that art (Bentham 1952: 83). A science founded on the utility 
principle, and its associated theory of action.  
Even if this definition of knowledge, in particular regarding economic knowledge, 
will  be  changed  and  challenged  in  economic  theory,  the  changes  can  be  seen 
as changes of degree and not of nature. Bentham defines utility as a relationship 
between the individual and an object, leading to a notion of subjective value, and as 
a motive of action, associated with the pursuit of well-being. This definition, contained 
in the utility principle, allows it to make a direct connection between art and science, 
for one, and between morals and science, for the other. If, following Bentham, utility 
is identified with well-being and well-being, as Bentham and most economists do,   
is defined as anything an agent prefers and as the ultimate aim of individual action, 
then Bentham’s argument –his behavioral model and its implications- still holds13. 
12  Scholars who doubt the continuity between Bentham’s utilitarianism and marginalism emphasize 
that even if some trace of the enunciative sense of the utility principle can be found in economic 
theory, there is no residue of its censorial sense (cf. Roncaglia 1999, Sigot 2001, Cohen 2010). But 
the point we advance here is that there is no possible separation between both senses, and that the 
legacy is not to be linked with the greatest utility principle but with its foundations: the utility principle.
13  This argument supposes a teleological definition of human action that might be questioned. Fol- This argument supposes a teleological definition of human action that might be questioned. Fol-
lowing Laval (2007: 24) it would be possible to argue that beyond this teleological definition there 
is a tautological explanation in presenting behavior as guided by interest understood as utility. This 
tautology, according to Laval, evidences a “normative ontology of the human being defined as an 
interested subject.” (Laval 2007: 24, our translation). However this questioning lies beyond the scope 
of this paper. 10
3.  The Science of the Lower Passions
In as much as well-being can be associated with wealth, an important moment of the 
entry of the utilitarian behavioral model in economic theory can be found in John Stuart 
Mill’s work. Stigler (1950a) contests such a statement because he believes Mill ignored 
utility. However, Sekerler (2007) gives grounds to this interpretation asserting that the 
utilitarian legacy is present in Mill’s works even if under a somewhat revised version: Mill 
would go beyond a hedonic view sustaining a eudemonic perspective. Such a perspective 
implies, as we have seen in the previous section, a theory of action. Bentham considers 
eudemonics is “the central place of meeting of all arts and sciences” (Bentham 1952: 83), 
it is the “object of every branch of art, and the subject of every art or science” (Bentham 
1952: 82-3). This definition allows advancing that his utilitarianism is inscribed within 
this approach linking virtue and utility, and thus establishing a direct relation between 
Bentham and Mill as regards their behavioral assumptions.
In his System of Logic Mill defines economics as the science that deals with human 
behavior as concerned with wealth:
“Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming 
wealth; and aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind, living 
in a state of society, would be impelled, if that motive, (…) were absolute ruler of all 
their actions.” (Mill, 2002 [1843]: 588) 
This  definition  clearly  means  economics  deals  with  individual  action  aimed  at 
acquiring wealth. In this sense, it can be associated with a theory of action, which 
differs from Bentham’s in that it does not pretend to explain every action but only 
those associated with “acquiring and consuming wealth” . Mill considers wealth as 
a  motivation  for  action  is  an  observation  susceptible  of  being  generalized. This 
observation, even if subject to variations, may represent an abstraction that allows 
to order and simplify reality in order to establish hypothetical truths. Such truths help 
thinking and understanding the phenomenon at hand, in this case, the market (Mill 
1991 [1863]) studying it separately from other social interrelated dynamics (Mill 2002 
[1843]: 587). More precisely, economics deals with phenomena whose immediate 
cause is the desire for wealth under the psychological law stating “that a greater 
gain is preferred to a smaller” (Mill 2002 [1843]: 587). From this regularity in human 
behavior, economics aims at explaining the portion of society that corresponds to the 
market. Its conclusions are not applicable to those parts of society where wealth is 
not the main motive of human action (Mill 2002 [1843]: 589).
Because of this delimitation Morgan (2006) presents Mill as the creator of the homo 
œconomicus who would be a being who desires wealth and can determine which the 
most effective way to acquire it is. As such, the economic agent chooses between of 
courses of action leading it to satisfy its desire for wealth. This being’s motivations are 
the desire for wealth, the dislike of work and the love of luxuries. These motivations 
can be associated with a utility calculation as it implies a balancing between what 
can be considered pleasures (wealth and luxuries) and pain (work) in order to obtain 11
well-being. Thus, the enunciative sense of the utility principle can be found at work 
in Mill’s definition of economics as a theory of action associated with the acquisition 
and consumption of wealth. More so, if we consider that Mill also said that economics 
studies such phenomena as the consequence of the laws of human nature (quoted 
in Morgan 2006: 5).  
It has been argued that in abandoning sensualism, Mill “is led to separate much 
more clearly utilitarianism as a moral criterion from utilitarianism as an interpretation 
of  human  behavior”  (Roncaglia  1999:  110). This  can  be  seen  not  only  in  Mill’s 
delimitation of the scope of economics but also in his distinction between higher and 
lower pleasures. This would mark a difference between Bentham and Mill but not 
necessarily between Bentham and RCT. As we will see, the Ordinalist Revolution 
and its heirs, acknowledge no such distinction. Just as Bentham, they will make no 
evaluation of choice based on its motivations, but only on its consequences, that is, 
on the adequacy between choice and its ends. Therefore, only instrumental rationality 
is required, meaning individuals are taken to choose what they prefer because it 
advances their well-being, as they understand it.    
William Stanley Jevons in his Theory of Political Economy (1871) explicitly follows Mill’s 
method of deriving explanations of social phenomena from behavioral principles that 
everyone considers to be general (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 87-8). He also shares with Mill 
the idea that the law behind market phenomena is the psychological law explaining 
the pursuit of wealth. And finally, he agrees in that the maximization of material well-
being associated with the calculus of pleasures and pains is not the only motivation 
of human action, even if it is the only one economic theory considers (Jevons 1970 
[1871]: 88-93). Jevons considers the economic man to be a calculating consumer, 
moving from the desire to acquire wealth to gaining utility from consumption, whose 
actions and motivations are defined in psychological unobservable terms (Morgan 
2006: 11). His “portrait was inspired by the economistic principle of utilitarianism and 
his belief that economic behavior should be characterized in the formal language of 
mathematics” (Morgan 2006: 11).  
Jevons  believes  that  economics  “rests  upon  a  few  notions  of  an  apparently 
simple character” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 77), the first one of which is utility. Utility 
explains value, and “the natural laws of the variation of utility” allow formulating 
“a satisfactory theory of exchange” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 77). Such a theory of 
exchange is based on his treatment of economics “as a calculus of pleasure and 
pain” , which explains why his theory “may be described as the mechanics of utility 
and self-interest” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 44, 90). This leads Jevons to define the 
object of economics as “to maximize happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it were, 
at the lowest cost of pain” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 91). Even if economics, according 
to Jevons, only deals with “the lowest rank of feelings” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 93), 
it still is based on a theory of human action that enables our understanding of 
market phenomena, such as exchange, that is individuals decisions to buy and 
sell commodities. Individuals choose one commodity over another because it 
maximizes  their  happiness,  and  they  will  purchase  it  until  they “derive  equal 12
pleasure form the possession of a small quantity more as [they] would from the 
money price of it” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 85)14.
Even if the data necessary for economic analysis is unobservable because it is given 
introspectively it can be considered to be universally valid. Otherwise, there would be 
one economic science for every individual. The solution to this apparent paradox is 
the utility principle (Black 1972: 126) in its enunciative sense. Economics deals with 
quantities: quantities of pleasures and pains just as individuals calculate their well-
being based on such quantities. But the fact that, for the time being, such quantities 
are not directly measurable, does not condemn economics to rely on unobservable or 
unverifiable data, disqualifying it as scientific knowledge. Even if utility is not directly 
observable, its effects are:
“Pleasures in short, are, for the time being, as the mind estimates them; so that we 
cannot make a choice, or manifest the will in any way, without indicating thereby an 
excess of pleasure in some direction” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 84). 
Therefore, following Bentham, a direct measure of utility is not really necessary. As 
long as it is unavailable, just as Marshall, Jevons followed Bentham’s suggestion of 
using the measuring rod of money15. This indicates it is possible to keep the theory of 
human agency associated with the enunciative sense of the utility principle without 
giving up the scientificity of economics. Moreover, it would be possible to overcome 
the subjective aspects of this inquiry using the developments of psychophysiology 
(c.f. Chaigneau 2002) where any mental state or psychological condition has a purely 
physical reaction making such states and conditions observable. Jevons asserts that 
motives in the mind give rise to phenomena (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 85) echoing the 
foundations of psychophysics. 
Jevons presents a hierarchy of motives where pleasures and pains are classified in 
the lowest rank. He insists on saying that utility calculations only happen at this level 
and only at this level the motivation of human action is the satisfaction of ordinary 
desires with the least cost in labor (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 88-93). Within the higher 
ranks we find all those motives that guide action beyond the pursuit of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain. However, if no superior motive intervenes, it is necessary 
and correct to use the calculus of the lower passions to obtain the greatest well- 
being in morally indifferent matters16. Therefore, the behavior observed on the market 
14   Immediately after this sentence, Jevons extends the same theory to explain an individuals’ decision 
on how much hours to work. 
15   In fact, Jevons does not see this lack of measuring units in Bentham as a real problem. For him, 
Bentham’s major drawback was that his theory did not take proper account of evolution and inheri-
tance. Bentham’s system, according to Jevons, does not recognize our “deep springs of unconquer-
able character” … “we start with inherent hereditary powers of growth” and Bentham ignored such 
innate feelings (Jevons 1879: 536-537).
16   Even if Jevons and other marginalists sustain that utilitarian behavior is relevant only in matters mor-  Even if Jevons and other marginalists sustain that utilitarian behavior is relevant only in matters mor-
ally indifferent this should not be understood as a denial of the morality of such behavior. Such view, 
denies any moral determination of human action on the market. Thus, according to this view, be-
cause an individual is more than an economic agent there is no moral value in the latter. This differs 
from Bentham’s position because he believes any action, in or outside the market, is the response 
to searching pleasure or avoiding pain. For Bentham the morality of any action is directly related to 
its capacity to maximize utility.  13
corresponds to this calculation and, in consequence, is the one that must be used 
in order to understand it (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 94). More precisely, “[f]or Jevons, 
the laws of supply and demand were founded on the ‘laws of human enjoyment’… 
Jevons found these laws, …, in Bentham’s springs of human action’ – our feelings of 
pleasure and pain” (Maas 2005: 271)17. 
Posing  utilitarian  behavior  as  the  model  to  be  followed  in  matters  of  moral 
indifference,  Jevons  intends  to  distance  economic  theory  from  moral  theory 
even if the former should have reasonable moral bases (Sigot 2002: 266) and 
even if they both are founded on Bentham’s felicific calculus (Sigot 2002: 275). 
However, this separation has further consequences regarding Bentham’s legacy 
in economic theory. Jevons intention is not only introducing the utilitarian model 
in economic theory but also making this theory a mathematical one. This latter 
goal introduces a simplification of Bentham’s theory as regards the dimensions 
of utility.  Instead of the original seven Bentham proposes, Jevons only retains 
two. In chapter II of his Theory of Political Economy, dealing with the Theory 
of Pleasure and Pain, and in particular with Pleasure and Pain as Quantities, 
Jevons recalls Bentham’s multidimensional value of pleasure and pain (Jevons 
1970 [1871]: 94). Bentham stated seven dimensions that or circumstances that 
determine the value of a pleasure or pain will have to a person: intensity, duration, 
certainty or uncertainty, propinquity and remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent. 
Jevons affirms the last three circumstances “are of high importance as regards 
the theory of morals; but they will not enter into the more simple and restricted 
problem which we attempt to solve in economics” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 94-95). 
This would mean that economics should deal with the other four dimensions. But 
this is not the case. Jevons retains only two: intensity and duration (Jevons 1970 
[1871]: 94). He states that Bentham made a mistake in considering certainty 
and propinquity as dimensions of value (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 56). Intensity and 
duration are enough to assess the value of “a feeling, whether of pleasure or of 
pain” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 95).  
According to Sigot (2001: 149-153) such simplification entails the elimination of the 
censorial sense of the utility principle and therefore of the central role of the legislator 
and the detachment of economics from other fields of action for the legislator. This 
would  indeed  mean  a  severe  restatement  of  Bentham’s  utilitarianism,  which  he 
considers first and foremost as an instrument for social reform that could only have 
 
 
17   Maas (2005: 173) asserts that Jevons “did not take recourse to Bentham’s hedonic calculus, but 
was motivated by the role notions of pleasure and pain played within the context of contemporary re-
search in physiology” . Maas (2005) and Chaigneau (2002) underline Richard Jenning’s influence on 
Jevons’s economic theory. Through this author Jevons realized the importance of the developments 
in psychophysiology for economic theory. We believe both influences are compatible because, con-
trary to what Maas seems to suggest, Bentham’s calculus is not confined to a normative stand. He 
expressly avoided using the term hedonic and stated the double aspect of his utility principle: on 
its positive side, the enunciative sense, the utility principle is a description of human action; on its 
normative side, the censorial sense, the utility principle is a guide for human action. As has already 
been mentioned in this text we trace the Benthamite influence on economic theory through the 
enunciative sense of his principle.  14
an impact in the hands of a legislator18. However, the enunciative sense remains as 
the basis for the study of individual behavior on the market. 
With  Jevons  begins  the  process  that  made  the  “utility  concept  evolve  from  its 
Benthamite to its modern form” (Warke 2000: 5), and which Warke (2000) has identified 
with  mathematical  fitness.  Jevons  would  have  completely  transformed,  and  in  a 
sense betrayed, Benthamite utilitarianism, for the sake of producing a mathematical 
science. In Jevons, as we have seen, the multidimensional character of the value of 
a feeling disappears. Warke (2000) explains this move as a way to avoid the index 
number problem which “tells us that no unique and continuous ordering exists for a 
multidimensional entity” (Warke 2000: 7). This would mean Jevons never gives up 
cardinal utility, which also leads him to inconsistencies, and a radical transformation 
that would distance him even more from Bentham. The transformation consists in 
moving from pleasure and pain to “physical objects or actions which are the source to 
us of pleasures and pains” (Warke 2000: 13). However, acknowledging the influence 
of psychophysics and its connection with Utilitarianism, this transformation does not 
respond to a technical concern but reflects a specific psychological theory. 
Indeed, this simplification of Bentham’s theory is not only due to Jevons’s preference 
for a mathematical presentation. Jevons, as Bentham, believes human beings make 
such calculations and if economics is to describe human behavior it must account for 
this central aspect of such behavior (Morgan 2006: 11). Individuals establish relations 
between quantities in their calculations and so economics must do so to (Maas 2005: 
172). Chaigneau (2002: 19) reminds us that Jevons always believed that economics 
should be based upon a deep understanding of human action and, in this sense, 
could be regarded as a branch of psychology. As such, it could explain the formation 
of prices as the expression of individual choices reflecting greater pleasure in one 
direction (Chaigneau 2002: 19-20). 
Jevons then can be seen as reflecting a position according to which economics, 
as the study of individual actions guided by self-interest, should include theories 
of behavior to be deduced from psychological laws about human wants, which in 
turn were understood in terms of the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. 
Pleasure and pain were treated as sensations, of which the person who experiences 
them has direct knowledge. By introspection, and by the study of other people’s 
reports of their introspections, an investigator could arrive at knowledge of the laws 
governing pleasure and pain (Bruni & Sugden 2007: 150). 
4.  The Unit of Meaning or the Law of Human Desires
Mill’s and Jevons’s economic theory use Bentham’s utilitarian model as the appropriate 
model of individual behavior. In the Preface to the first edition of his Theory Jevons 
 
18   In order to evaluate these claims it would seem necessary to extend this study to welfare econom-  In order to evaluate these claims it would seem necessary to extend this study to welfare econom-
ics and to social choice theory. A working hypothesis, at least in welfare economics, could be that 
once interpersonal comparisons of utility are allowed and/or possible the censorial sense can be 
retrieved. Such study lies beyond the scope of this paper.15
clearly states his work is an attempt to study economic behavior as a calculation of 
pleasures and pains, or better yet, as a maximization of well-being (Jevons 1970 
[1871]: 44). Further on, at the beginning of the third chapter, he writes:
“Pleasure and pain are undoubtedly the ultimate objects of the calculus of economics. 
To satisfy our wants to the utmost with the least effort—to produce the greatest amount 
of what is desirable at the expense of the least that is undesirable—in other words, to 
maximize pleasure, is the problem of economics.” (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 101)
From this behavioral axiom, as we already mentioned, economic theory should deduce 
the laws that explain market phenomena, and, in particular, the law of supply and 
demand. One of the most important steps in this direction can be found in Herman 
Heinrich Gossen’s 1854 text. Amongst other things, in that text Gossen develops the 
law of satiable desires, the law of the equalization of desires and the law of scarcity 
(Jevons  1970  [1871]:  60-64).  In  the  Preface  to  the  Second  edition  of  his  Theory, 
Jevons recognizes Gossen’s authorship of these developments already present in the 
First edition, where Jevons does not mention Gossen because, he says, he had no 
knowledge of his work due to his complete ignorance of German (Jevons 1970 [1871]). 
Economic theory during the XIXth century followed this path which had started with 
the utilitarian model of human behavior. Alfred Marshall in his Principles of Economics 
(1890) presents an organized and systematized synthesis of all these contributions 
giving an almost definitive form to consumer theory. According to Wong (2006 [1978]) 
the theory had the following features: consumers are motivated by the pursuit of utility 
which, at the level of the lower passions, can be obtained through the consumption of 
goods (Wong 2006 [1978]: 26). The amount of utility obtained from the consumption 
of any good is determined by the law of satiable desires, that is, decreasing marginal 
utility (Wong 2006 [1978]: 26-27). Given the prices and her income, the consumer 
chooses a particular combination of goods such that the marginal utility of each good 
divided by its price is equal over all goods (Wong 2006 [1978]: 27). This behavior is 
the basis of the law of demand because according to the law of decreasing marginal 
utility any increase in the price of one good is compensated adjusting the consumed 
quantity of the good (Wong 2006 [1978]: 27). The same reasoning applied to the 
theory of the producer explains the law of supply. Thus, utilitarian calculus appears 
as the unit of meaning of the construction of economic behavior as an expression of 
the laws of human desires. 
This implies that Marshall’s theory continues in the line of Jevons, constructing a theory 
of action capable of accounting for choice on the basis of a mental-state psychology. 
Just as Jevons, Marshall makes no claim to measure any affection of the mind but 
believes it is possible to have an indirect one through its effects (Warke 2000: 22): 
“But the economist studies mental states rather through their manifestations than in 
themselves; and, if he finds they afford evenly balanced incentives to action, he treats 
them prima facie as for his purpose equal” (Marshal 1920: 16, quoted in Warke 2000: 24). 16
This  allows  Marshall  to  maintain  the  theory  of  human  action  derived  from  the 
enunciative sense of the utility principle even if he never explicitly linked “economic 
studies  with any  ethical  doctrine  in particular”  (Keynes  1925:  318). According  to 
Keynes (1924: 318), “Marshall never departed explicitly from the utilitarian ideas 
which dominated the generations of economists who preceded him” but he seems 
to  have  had  little  interest  in  such  ideas  (Backhouse  2006:  31). “The  solution  of 
economic problems was for Marshall, not an application of the hedonistic calculus, 
but a prior condition of the exercise of man’s higher faculties, irrespective, almost, 
of  what  we  mean  by ‘higher’”  (Keynes  1924:  319). �evertheless,  it  is  difficult  to 
assert an important distance between Marshall and the theory of action entailed 
by the enunciative sense of the utility principle in sight of his study of the decisions 
individuals take in the ordinary business of everyday life. 
Keynes  (1924:  319)  sustains  that  even  if  Marshall  reached  economics  through 
ethics, due to his concern about the degradation poverty caused on humankind, he 
thought economics had no special means of information on the moral and political 
capabilities of human nature. Economics deals with “the modes and principles of 
the daily business of life, by which human happiness and opportunities for good life 
are, in great measure determined” (Keynes 1924: 321). This definition of economics 
echoes  the  enunciative  sense,  and  eudemonics.  It  makes  a  direct  connection 
between everyday actions, choices and decisions with happiness, which is even 
more than what Bentham does if we remember the latter spoke of well-being as a 
more general feeling than happiness. In any case, this definition implies everyday 
actions have a specific purpose, and economics studies how individuals act in view 
of this aim.  
Moreover, in one of his early economic writings On Utilitarianism: a Summum Bonnum 
Marshall explores the formulation of a social utility function. This function would help 
to understand and develop “the highest ideal of humanity” (Marshall 1975: 317). And 
this highest ideal could “be taken to mean the highest capabilities of action … and 
this may bring with it happiness so much more intense than can be gotten any other 
way” (Marshall 1975: 317). This goal clearly lies within what Bentham and Mill called 
eudemonics, the highest of all knowledge19. 
Even if his strict separation between ethics and economics makes Marshall the 
“first great economist pur sang” , as Keynes called him (Keynes 1924: 364-365), the 
enunciative sense of the utility principle still seems to inform his presentation of 
supply and demand. As in Mill and Jevons, economic theory for Marshall deals with 
one part of human action that is not directly linked to morals. This part is portrayed by 
the descriptive sense of the utility principle and, in consequence, Bentham’s model 
of human behavior can still be considered as an adequate description of individual 
economic action. In this sense, the theory of action associated with economic inquiry 
keeps in line with a utilitarian legacy. 
 
19   It can even be linked with the censorial sense of the utility principle.17
4.1  Utility as Unit of Construction
All these theoretical constructions rely on the existence of a unit of pleasure, that is, 
of a quantity that adjusts when changes in prices take place. Considering this unit 
as the building block of economic behavior led many economists, including Jevons 
and Marshall as we have seen, to think about the need of measuring it, in spite of 
their explicit claims of an indirect measure as enough for the purposes of economics. 
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth was probably the author who most insisted on the need of 
this measure and, more specifically, of its direct measure. Edgeworth’s work closely 
follows Bentham and Jevons. He recognizes Jevons’ influence on his own starting point 
in the study of economics: the individual as a pleasure machine (Sekerler 2009: 8). 
Following in his steps, Edgeworth believes utility can be measured and he submits 
the existence of such measure in an axiomatic form in Mathematical Psychics (1881):
“Pleasure is measurable, and all pleasures are commensurable; so much of one 
sort of pleasure felt by one sentient being equateable to so much of other sorts of 
pleasure felt by other sentients.” (Edgeworth, 1881: 59-60)20.
Edgeworth admits measuring pleasure has not achieved satisfactory results at the 
time he writes and he admits perspectives are rather dim (Edgeworth 1881: 98). 
However, he believes the study of feelings and sensations is at a state similar to the 
studies of heat and electricity before their existence as exact sciences (Edgeworth, 
1881: 98). Thus, it can be expected that the calculus of pleasure will have some day 
an instrument as the thermometer or the voltmeter allowing increasing precision in 
estimations. In the meantime, Edgeworth states important developments can take 
place in theory because mathematical reasoning is possible even if there is no 
numerical data (Edgeworth, 1881: 2). Quantitative relations such as greater than or 
smaller than, more or less, increase or loss, are enough to derive conclusions with 
an enormous explicative value (Edgeworth, 1881). Mathematical reasoning seems 
to be the natural language for economics because it “investigates the arrangements 
between agents each tending to his own maximum utility” (Edgeworth, 1881: 6). 
Thus, these quantitative relations, instrumental in thinking maximums, can be used 
to examine the hedonic forces behind individual action (Edgeworth, 1881: 15). 
At the time Edgeworth was writing, psychologists were conducting several studies 
to measure discriminative sensibility, that is, to determine how much one sensibility   
 
differs from another21. Ernst Heinrich Weber, Gustav Theodor Fechner and Wilhelm 
Wundt led these studies (c.f. Chaigneau 2002, Sent 2004, Bruni 2010), which are 
considered as the origin of modern psychology (Bruni & Sugden 2007: 151). They tried 
20   This argument distances Edgeworth from Bentham and Jevons. For the latter, even if it is possible 
to have an approximate monetary measure of pleasures and pains, these entities are incommensu-
rable between individuals and for the same individual. It has been argued in the literature this point 
in Bentham’s theory brings him closer to an ordinal than to a cardinal theory of utility. It is not the 
same having an approximate or indirect measure and reducing such measure to a comparable unit. 
21   In Mathematical Psychics Edgeworth refers to the debates between psychologists at the time. In 
particular, he discusses the theories of Fechner, Delbeouf and Wundt (Edgeworth 1881: 61-63).18
to explain the psychophysical law they considered the most fundamental expression 
of  the  study  of  sensibility  (James  1890:  534).  In  their  study  of  the  connections 
between  sensation,  stimuli  and  response,  Fechner  advanced  the  foundational 
idea  of  psychophysics  stating  that  “mental  phenomena  could  be  measured  by 
finding quantitative relationships between material stimuli and mental sensations” 
(Bruni & Sugden 2007: 151). Following in his steps Wundt implemented laboratory 
experiments that allowed him to classify “sensations in categories similar to those of 
Jevons, Edgeworth, Bentham and Beccaria” (Bruni 2010: 101).
One of the conclusions of this line of studies was that:
“How much stronger or weaker one sensation is than another, we are never able to 
say (…) The natural measure of sensation which we possess enables us to judge of 
the equality, of the ‘more’ and of the ‘less’ , but not of ‘how many times more or less’ . 
(…) In a word, we know by our natural sensibility nothing of the law that connects the 
sensation and its outward cause together. To find this we must find an exact measure 
for the sensation itself.” (Wundt 1863, quoted in James 1890: 348-349)
The measure of these magnitudes appears as the first step towards understanding 
individuals’ sensitive reactions to external objects, and also as the first step towards 
understanding their behavior (James 1890: 549-50). Such an explanation, based 
on quantities, would allow the use of mathematics in psychology. So, just as Jevons 
pursued a mathematized economics, psychophysics was the domain of mathematical 
psychologists (Heukelom 2010).  
The  most  significant  advance  in  this  direction  was  achieved  with  the  Weber-
Fechner law (James 1890: 351). This law generalized the results of a long series of 
experiments showing that sensation varied in the same proportion as the logarithm 
of the change in the stimulus22 (James 1890). In other words, the law suggested that 
for the observed subject to report arithmetical increases in her sensation levels they 
had to increase geometrically. 
 
This result was interpreted as the scientific proof of the law of satiety, that is, of 
decreasing marginal utility (Colander 2007: 219, Bruni & Sugden 2007: 151), and 
as closely related to Bernoulli’s solution of the St. Petersburg paradox, stating that 
utility derived from a given monetary gain decreases with increasing initial wealth, 
leading to the confirmation of the foundations of a RCT, which would ground the 
psychophysics  of  wealth  and  utility  (Heukelom  2008:  6,  Bruni  2010:  101-103). 
Edgeworth was particularly aware of these developments (Bruni 2010: 103): 
22  “In mathematical form that law (Weber-Fechner) is: p � k ln (S/So) where p is the individual per- “In mathematical form that law (Weber-Fechner) is: p � k ln (S/So) where p is the individual per-
ception of change, S is the added stimulus, So is the begging stimulus, and k is the relation pa-
rameter. (…) In psychology, the Weber-Fechner Law has been superseded by the Steven’s Power 
Law (1957), which specifies the relationship between sensation as S � kIa where S is the intensity 
of sensation, I is the magnitude of physical stimulus, and the exponent a is empirically estimated 
among senses.” (Colander 2007: 218).19
“The function he [Edgeworth] proposed was ‘the quasi-Fechnerian law’ , according 
to which it is possible to cardinally measure pleasure (only in 1881 he introduced 
explicitly the ‘utility function’; in 1879 he addressed the problem of intersubjective 
comparability). […], Edgeworth derived this result from the frontier of experimental 
psychology  of  his  time,  the  psychophysical  researches  of  Wundt  and  Fechner.” 
(Baccini 2007: 1991).
Baccini (2007: 93) asserts that Edgeworth’s use and analysis of pleasure and its 
measure allows him to envisage the construction of a theory of action, necessary to 
explain market exchange. This view confirms the incidence of the utilitarian legacy in 
the formulation of a theory of human agency leading to the explanation of decision 
and choice in the market as advancing self-interest, reflected in utility calculations.  
However, psychologists rejected the law (Colander 2007: 218). William James, one of 
the most influential psychologists of the time, writes: “The whole notion of measuring 
sensations numerically, remains in short a mere mathematical speculation about 
possibilities, which have never been applied into practice” (James 1890: 539). Some 
marginalists shared James’s opinion on the direct measure of sensations. In his 
Principles Marshall asserts: “It is essential to note that the economist does not claim 
to measure any affection of the mind in itself, or directly; but only indirectly through 
its effect” (Marshall 1890: 15). In this same line, Jevons notes we cannot measure 
sensations themselves just as we cannot measure gravity itself. �evertheless, “(…) 
just as we measure gravity by its effects in the motion of a pendulum, so we may 
estimate the equality or inequality of feelings by the decisions of the human mind” 
(Jevons  1970  [1871]:  83-84). Although  Jevons  was  not  very  consistent  with  his 
claim, in several passages of his works he talks about “quantity of utility” , he sustains 
that decision is to feelings as the pendulum is to gravity, where their variations are 
registered in prices (Jevons 1970 [1871]: 84). So, even if there are no numerical units 
to express the quantities of pleasure, as noted above, they can be reconstructed from 
the observation of decisions in the market, stating a direct relationship between well-
being and choice. This procedure allows identifying, at least partially, the direction of 
pleasure and its relationship with its preceding units (Jevons 1970 [1871]). Therefore, 
even if the Weber-Fechner law was perceived as an advance, the direct measurement 
and definition of units of utility was not a vital condition for the development and 
scientificity of the theory of human agency underlying economic theory or Benthamite 
Utilitarianism. In other word, utility kept being the unit of meaning and construction of 
economic theory even if it could not be directly measured23. 
Economists finally abandoned the Weber-Fechner law with three arguments (Stigler 
1950b: 377): “the laws does not hold in all cases”; “the law refers to psychical reactions 
to external stimuli whereas economics deals with observable behavior in response to 
subjective needs” , confirming Bentham’s, Jevons’ and Marshall’s belief in the visible 
effects of utility maximizing behavior; and, finally, “economics can get along with   
 
23  It is important to remember here the double sense of utility: subjective value and characterization 
of action. �ot being able to find a direct measure affect the first sense but not the second, the one 
informing the enunciative sense of the utility principle.20
the empirical fact that man has limited means to satisfying competing ends and 
can allocate these means rationally to maximize the fulfillment of the ends”24. �ote 
that this last reason continues in the line of instrumental rationality advocated in the 
enunciative sense of the utility principle.  
The disagreement over the measure of utility and its unit did not mean an overt 
rejection of the utilitarian behavior model. The theory of action, as Bentham had 
already stated, did not depend upon such matters. Pleasure could be associated with 
preferences, and preferences could be observed in choices. Utility kept describing 
human action tending to maximize well-being, an optimum combination of pleasures 
and pains. Even if it could not be measured it could be observed.   
There was little agreement among the first marginalists regarding the commensurability 
of pleasure, satisfaction, or utility. Some, like Edgeworth, believed the explanatory 
unit of action was common to all, and could eventually be directly measured; others, 
like Marshall and Jevons, sustained this unit was common only for a single individual 
and could be measured indirectly through its effects on prices. These interpretations 
evidenced the disagreement about the method with which pleasure, satisfaction or 
utility should be tackled in order to guarantee a scientific basis to economic theory. 
Vilfredo Pareto believed this disagreement was inevitable due to the way in which the 
theory of consumer choice had been defined: 
“Choices  have  been  explained  as  man’s  aim  to  achieve  maximum  pleasure. 
Between two things, man chooses the one that provides more pleasure. The point 
of equilibrium is obtained by expressing the conditions mathematically that enable 
the individual to enjoy the maximum pleasure compatible with the obstacles he 
meets (…) The use of this point of view forces us to consider pleasure as a quantity.” 
(Pareto 1900, quoted in Marchionatti y Mornati 2007: xxiv)
The first formulations of consumer theory lead economists, as Pareto states, to 
define equilibrium using cardinal functions. More precisely, the theory needed a unit 
of pleasure to determine the satisfaction derived from consumption, which allowed 
building utility curves that reflected levels of satisfaction. However, the construction 
unit the theory required was not determined and it was not clear it could ever be. This 
situation was bound to produce not only disagreements among economists but also 
confusion within economic theory.
On  the  conceptual  level  another  situation  prevailed.  Even  if  there  were  some 
divergences  about  the  search  of  utility  as  the  sole  motive  of  human  action, 
economists accepted that market behavior responded to such a motivation. Hence, 
the actions of economic agents were interpreted using the decision model inherited 
from the enunciative sense of Bentham’s utility principle. Postulating utility as motive   
 
24   Moreover, Stigler (1950b: 377) disqualifies the law not only for these three reasons but also because 
it does not “yield fruitful hypotheses concerning economic behavior.” 21
for action, it became the unit of meaning of economic behavior: the decision model 
economic theory uses can only reproduce actions responding to rationality defined 
in terms of utility. If utility is not the motivation of behavior, economic theory cannot 
give any account of it. 
5.  The Fundamental Principles of Pure Theory and its Limits
Between May 1892 and October 1893 Pareto published five articles in the Giornali degli 
Economisti. These articles are known as the Considerazioni sui principio fondamentali 
dell’economia. In these articles it is clear Pareto’s conception of the behavioral model 
underlying economic theory is the same as the one we have been discussing25: “�ow, 
when dealing with economic phenomena, it seems to us that by considering men as 
perfect hedonist we do not stray too far at all from reality” (Pareto 2007 [1892-1893]: 
20). As his predecessors26, Pareto affirms it is correct for economic theory to suppose 
individuals act on the market motivated by the desire to obtain more satisfaction with 
the least possible effort. As Bentham, Pareto supports this conception on a careful 
observation of human action, being observation the only valid grounds for scientific 
efforts. Observational data would then lead economics in the path of science:
“All the natural sciences now have reached the point where the facts are studied directly. 
Political Economy also has reached it, in large part at least. It is only in the other social 
sciences that people still persist in reasoning about words; but we must get rid of that 
method if we want these sciences to progress.” (Pareto 1971 [1906]: 10, our italics)
Even if, contrary to physics, chemistry and mechanics, economics cannot produce 
its knowledge through experimentation or, at least not always, its incapacity should 
not keep it from grounding its concepts empirically. Economics, as meteorology and 
astronomy, can offer scientific explanations about its object of study using observation 
(Pareto 1971 [1906]: 11). The success of such explanations depends on how well 
phenomena exhibiting some regularity can be identified and if a plausible explanation 
of their functioning can be provided (Pareto 1971 [1906]: 5-12). �evertheless, warns 
Pareto, with or without experimentation, the theory’s capacity to adapt to its object   
is limited. Therefore, a theory cannot be expected to be a copy of reality because it 
is not the whole of reality that theory is trying to grasp; neither can it be expected 
to be a mere reflection of the variables it uses because theory is not restricted to a 
description due to its interpretations and use of the variables – there always remain 
indeterminable  residues  when  theorizing  the  phenomena  studied  (Pareto  1971   
[1906]: 7). Hence, “(…) we should never judge the value of a theory by investigating   
 
25   This claim advances an interpretation that goes beyond the traditional view of Pareto as being 
centered on solving the integrability problem, pursuing ordinalism and looking for a new explanation 
of ophelimity. It could also account for Pareto’s alleged ambiguity, having been depictured as not 
consistently ordinalist or behavioralist (Moscati 2007) even if one accepts that behavioralism could 
not have influenced his writing as it had not yet been developed (Bruni 2010: 104).
26   With the notable exception of Walras, who is conspicuously absent from our story. This omission 
can be justified with the increasing literature on the dehomogenization of the Marginalist Revolution 
starting with Jaffé (1976) and in particular with work on the secondary role utility plays in his work 
(cf. Sekerler 2009). 22
whether it deviates in some way from reality because no theory withstands or will 
ever withstand a test.” (Pareto 1971 [1906]: 8). 
The behavioral model economic theory uses reflects the regular behavior on the 
market, isolated from any other moment or behavior. According to Pareto, the same 
idea lies behind studying isolated or abstracted economic actions than behind the 
study of the homo œconomicus who only performs economic actions (Pareto 1971 
[1906]: 12). The first marginalists –or, as Pareto calls them, the ‘new school’- built 
their theory on a model of human behavior that thinks of action as motivated only by 
the search of individual utility (Pareto 1971 [1906]: 29). Even if they believe this model 
of human action can only explain economic or market behavior, they observe that 
most people go to the market to pursue their self-interest, or their utility, and they use 
this regularity of human behavior as the explanatory unit of economic phenomena 
(Pareto 1971 [1906]). And, as shown above, Pareto does not believe they are wrong. 
Thus Pareto defines economics as the science of logical action: action repeated many 
times “directed towards the satisfaction of tastes through acquisition of goods” (Bruni 
& Sugden 2007: 156). Economists can observe the results of such actions: choices 
on the market. Such choices, according to the definition of economics, are assumed 
to satisfy tastes or respond to the maximization of individual utility. For Pareto, as for 
Mill, Jevons, Marshall and Edgeworth, economics stands on a particular theory of 
human action explaining choice that can be directly traced to the enunciative sense 
of the utility principle.  
According to Pareto, this method is amazing not only because it builds a whole 
science upon a unique postulate, but also because it is logically flawless (Pareto 
2007 [1892-1893]: 5, 13). This latter characteristic only holds if we do not forget that 
the laws valid for abstractions may not hold in reality (Pareto 2007 [1892-1893]). This 
caution allows formulating explanations that help to understand different phenomena 
always having in mind that reality is not reduced with the conceptualizations we 
might make of it (Pareto 1971 [1906]: 13). Pretending to reduce the whole of human 
behavior to the utilitarian model and using it to explain human activities for which it 
was not thought “(…) end[s] up producing fairy tales that are less entertaining but not 
more real than Adolfo’s voyage to the moon.” (Pareto 2007 [1897]: 21).
This  caution  extends  to  the  temptation  of  thinking  that  all  economic  behavior 
necessarily responds to the fundamental principle of hedonic calculus Edgeworth 
advanced. The principle “(…) that every man continues the transformation of the 
economic goods until by so operating he can procure a positive infinitesimal final 
degree of utility” ((Pareto 2007 [1897]: 17) only holds for some actions on the market. 
In fact, according to Pareto, there are other reasons that explain such actions (Pareto 
2007 [1897]: 19). This is particularly true when considering the variation of prices. 
In many occasions people do not act following a utilitarian calculus but following 
market trends reflected in the changes in prices (Pareto 2007 [1897]: 19). This type of 
behavior is not exclusive to stock markets or commercial transactions, according to 
Pareto, it can also be found in retail trade. In the latter, people who have a good which 23
they wish to trade for money do not equate the gain from the income thus obtained 
with the benefit of having consumed the good they are trading. Their only goal is to 
get the highest possible price (Pareto 2007 [1897]: 19). Furthermore, the agents’ 
cognitive capacities nuance the utility calculation (Pareto 2007 [1897]: 20). Even if 
large traders might be able to make complex intertemporal optimizations, Pareto 
believes most people are not entirely provident (Pareto 2007 [1897]: 20). 
All this means that not only should economists be careful in not extending the model 
beyond economic phenomena, but also, that they should not expect too much from 
the agents in terms of rationality. It does not mean Pareto rejects the behavioral 
model inherited from Bentham. Pareto insists economics should not exceed its limits 
and it should only deal with actions on the market and with “(…) the many logical, 
repeated actions which men perform to procure the things which satisfy their tastes” 
(Pareto  1971  [1906]:  103,  190)27. This  behavior  guarantees  the  correspondence 
between  subjective  and  objective  facts;  and,  this  correspondence  is  what  the 
utilitarian calculus is looking for28. The calculus has to do with final degrees of utility 
and not with total degrees of utility:
“�one of us has a clear idea of the utility of eating, drinking, dressing, having a house 
where one can shelter, but we only understand its advantages for small variations, 
positive or negative, in other words our mind only comprehends the concept of final 
degree of utility.” (Pareto 2007 [1892]: 18)
Final degrees of utility are defined as the relation between the agent and the very small 
unit of a good added to the quantity the agent already has. Final degrees were then 
the same as the notions of marginal utility or scarcity. The linguistic innovation did not 
solve a problem Pareto –as well as Irving Fisher and Gustav Cassel29- perceived in the 
theory: how is it possible to found a science on a unit that has not been determined? 
Rather, it clearly reflected a conception of human action in line with the one found in the 
enunciative sense of the utility principle, and hence with eudemonics.
Furthermore, because no empirical measure of utility is available, the correspondence 
between final degrees and marginal utility or scarcity was still perceived as problematic   
 
27  The latter kind of actions are important because it guarantees that subjective facts conform to objec- The latter kind of actions are important because it guarantees that subjective facts conform to objec-
tive facts, that is, that agents choose the combination of goods that maximizes their utility (Pareto 
1971 [1906]: 103, 190). �ote that this assertion relies on an explicit assumption Pareto makes: 
repetition is a good substitute for intelligence (Pareto 2007 [1892]: 21). In this sense, Pareto would 
assert that “economics is interested in repetitive patterns of behavior” (Stigler 1950b: 381). By the 
way, Stigler considered this view as a “minor aberration” (Stigler 1950b: 381). 
28  The correspondence is in any case between subject and object and never between subjects (Pareto 
1971[1906]: 105). In other words, the task of economics is to study how people compare utilities and, 
using this comparison, choose a certain bundle of goods. Economics is not concerned with how 
agents stand in respect to each other according to an interpersonal comparison of utilities (ibid.). 
Even if in Considerazioni we can find the possibility of personal comparisons -“The day perhaps will 
come when we are able to have an idea of the form of that function [utility function] for our societies 
(…)”- (Pareto 2007 [1892-1893]: 23), in the Manual Pareto considered this field of research as the 
less developed of all (Pareto 1971 [1906]: 106). 
29   24
at the time precisely because it seems to rely on subjective facts, only known through 
introspection. Irving Fisher (1965 [1892]) tries to solve this problem disconnecting 
economics from hedonism. This disconnection would be achieved if it were possible to 
give an empirical basis to the economic behavioral model. In order to do this, Fisher 
advances a postulate stating that utility curves could be derived from the observation 
of real individual decisions on the market. But, we must not forget that this postulate is 
in line with what Bentham, Jevons, Marshall and Edgeworth had already said: there is 
no real need for introspection because the effects of subjective states of mind can be 
observed in choices on the market. As we shall see in what follows, Samuelson will follow 
Fisher’s lead. Fisher believes that even though no one has denied that desire underlies 
economic activity, the motive of desire does not have to be part of the study in economics 
(Fisher 1965 [1892]: 11). Economics should only follow a simple psychoeconomical 
postulate stipulating each individual acts as she desires (ibid.). �evertheless, as Sweezy 
(1934) remarks, this postulate does not offer real empirical foundations. Saying that 
people act as they wish is the same as saying people act as they do (Sweezy 1934: 178-
9). This tautology underlying formal explanation only eliminates any possible empirical 
significance (Sweezy 1934: 178-9). Gustav Cassel (1918) also tried to solve the problem 
advancing that the explanation of prices only needs assumptions on demand and not on 
individual behavior because, in the end, even if economics deals with the satisfaction of 
human needs, the act of satisfaction itself, not being an economic activity, relies beyond 
its scope (Cassel 1954 [1918]: 3). Cassel’s views did not receive great attention in part, 
as Stigler (1950b: 390-1) and Wong (2006: 6) note, due to Knut Wicksell’s disqualifying 
criticisms of his theory of value. In any case, the connection between Utilitarianism, a 
theory of action, and rational choice remained.
5.1  The Theory of Ordinal Utility
Pareto considers that as long as the final degree of utility is the cornerstone of all 
economic reasoning it is necessary to acquire all the information possible about it 
because “this topic is of the utmost importance for the science and deserves to be 
studied with great care by economists” (Pareto 2007 [1892-1893]: 18). According 
to Pareto, Jevons and Edgeworth shared his opinion. The former believed it would 
not be possible to understand the dynamics of exchange “until we can numerically 
express with some degree of approximation the laws of the variation of utility” (Pareto 
2007 [1892-1893]: 59). The latter argued that even if valuable ideas can be obtained 
through mathematical relations, there are many useful conclusions that could be 
derived if a measure could be attached to utility (Pareto 2007 [1892-1893]: 59). Thus, 
for these authors, the measure of the final degree of utility would bring new lights 
to theory even if the results where only approximate. Edgeworth, as noted above, 
envisaged the possibility of a direct measure of utility. Pareto, like Jevons, thought an 
indirect measure was the best response:
“The objection that pleasure, and therefore utility, cannot be directly measured does 
not hold. In the natural sciences we have many quantities that are impossible to 
measure directly and are indirectly measured.” (Pareto, 2007 [1892-1893]: 58)25
However,  the  real  possibility  of  agents  realizing  the  quantity  of  pleasure  they 
obtain from switching to one good to another, clouds this hypothetical possibility of 
measuring utility (Pareto 2007 [1892-1893]: 19-20). An average agent can hardly 
meet the cognitive demands associated to such a calculation. Therefore, even if 
Pareto considers the adoption of utility as unit of meaning of market behavior poses 
no major problems, the necessary calculation capacities to equalize the magnitudes 
of final degrees of utility constitute a strong assumption given how most economic 
agents make their decisions.
Faced with the hypothetical possibility of measuring the final degrees of utility and 
with the strong suspicion about the agents’ capacity to realize how much pleasure 
they could derive from one good or another, Pareto reformulates the theory so 
as to make the measure and the conscience about the final degrees of utility 
unnecessary:
“In  order  to  examine  general  economic  equilibrium,  this  measurement  is  not 
necessary. It is sufficient to ascertain if one pleasure is larger or smaller than another. 
This is the only fact we need to build a theory.” (Pareto 1898, quoted in Marchionatti 
and Gambino 1997: 1335)
This statement does away with the need for a unit of measure but not with the theory 
of action. Pareto still uses the term pleasure and the possibility of comparing feelings 
of pleasure. In another of his texts, Pareto develops this idea stating that equations in 
pure economic theory need not express anything more than preferences to account 
for market behavior (Marchionnati and Gambion 1997: 1335). With this view it would 
seem Pareto differentiates preferences from motivations of actions. According to this 
view, there is no need to investigate the pains and pleasures that led to a choice 
because there is no need to refer to psychological or metaphysical entities in order to 
model market behavior. This means Pareto aims at constructing a separate science 
of economics following his methodology of analysis and synthesis. Pure economics 
deals with the analysis of logical action, whereas applied economics, as practice, 
might need “to draw from the findings of sociology or psychology” (Bruni & Sugden 
2007:  155).  Indicating,  each  science  analyses  a  component  of  human  action, 
economics logical action and sociology non-logical action, and their combination 
or synthesis will inform practice dealing with complex social phenomena. Therefore, 
pure economics does not deal with the motivation of action but this does not imply 
it does not present a theory of action. As we have seen, logical action means there 
is a coincidence between objective and subjective facts, a definition that allows 
not investigating motivations, and understanding preferences and choices as the 
expression of this coincidence.  
Hence, pure consumer theory can be thought exclusively in terms of preferences, 
where different indexes are associated to each indifference curve and a number is 
given to each where their relation is pictured through smaller or bigger numbers 
(Pareto  1971  [1906]:  118-24).  Thus,  whereas  indifference  curves  denote  the 
combinations that would produce the same satisfaction, pleasure or utility to the 26
consumer, the indexes indicate combinations that are superior – in terms of utility 
– to the first one considered. With the shift from utility to indifference curves Pareto 
reformulates consumer theory in terms of preference orderings and in so doing 
establishes the ordinal theory of utility. In line with his definition of logical action, and 
with the language he uses, this ordinal theory allows doing away with the problem of 
direct measurement of utility but not with the theory of human agency inherited from 
Utilitarianism.
With  this  reformulation  Pareto  believes  he  is  reinforcing  the  scientific  status  of 
economics because it now requires “weaker theoretical assumptions” accounting for 
“stronger empirical foundations” (Bruno and Guala 2001: 26). This way, Pareto uses 
what he considers to be an empirical method to ground economic theory (Bruno and 
Guala 2001: 28). Pareto’s concern about the scientific status of economic theory also 
explains his use of the term ophelimity rather than utility. Its use would rid economics 
of  any  metaphysical  discussions  and  would  bring  it  closer  to  a  natural  science 
founded on facts (Bruno and Guala 2001: 29). However, having defined ophelimity 
as a kind of subjective utility or, more precisely, as “the relationship of convenience, 
which makes things satisfy a need or a desire, whether legitimate or not” (quoted 
in Bruno and Guala 2001: 28), and economics as the science of ophelimity keeps 
Pareto in the lines of Bentham’s Utilitarianism. As Bruno and Guala (2001: 29) remark 
“those who have seen ophelimity as a means to eliminate hedonism30 from economic 
science -…- are therefore mistaken” .
Consequently, the theory of ordinal utility does not mean that utility ceases to be the 
unit of meaning of the economic behavior model31, or that it is possible to do away 
with it as unit of construction (cf. Bruno and Guala 2001: 30). The pursuit of utility is 
still the motive of the action under investigation; maybe not for all actions but, at least, 
for the relevant behavior for economic theory. Pareto then continues on the utilitarian 
path warning that being “careful in attributing real existence to some entities does 
not mean that these entities must be banned from scientific discourse” (Bruno and 
Guala 2001: 43). Just as Jevons and Edgeworth before him, Pareto believes their 
real existence could be ascertained when a scientific psychology would be able to 
provide the necessary evidence (Bruno and Guala 2001: 40). 
5.2  The Ordinalist Revision
J.R.  Hicks  considers  Pareto’s  ordinal  theory  as  one  of  the  most  important 
contributions to economic theory. �ot only does it require less information to model 
consumer behavior, it also allows the reconstruction of the objective functions using 
the observed behavior of agents on the market (Hicks 1945 [1939]: 11-2). As Pareto 
already noted, this could not be achieved with utility functions because the same 
preference ordering could result from multiple functions; that is, even if it is possible 
to derive a preference ordering from a utility function, the utility function could not   
 
30   We have already noted that Bentham inscribes his utilitarianism rather in the lines of eudemonics 
than in those of hedonism. 
31   Besides, as noted above, an ordinal approximation to utility can also be found in Bentham.27
be deduced from the preference ordering (Pareto 1971 [1906]: 110-4), leading to 
what is has been known as the integrability problem. As decisions on the market 
allow knowing which bundle is preferred but not how much it is preferred, modeling 
using preference orderings has technical advantages. Thus, founding the behavioral 
model on these orderings avoids the problem associated with the lack of a unit of 
construction – a measure – needed when using utility surfaces and, at the same time, 
it preserves its explanatory power. Eliminating this unit of construction guarantees 
parsimony in economic theory:
“The quantitative concept of utility is not necessary to explain market phenomena. 
Therefore, following the principle of Occam’s razor, it is better to do without it; because, 
in practice, it is not indifferent that a theory should have unnecessary fields” (Hicks 
1945[1939]: 12, our translation).
However, Hicks does not discard the search for such a measure and even believes 
that if someone were to find any lead enabling him or her to establish a quantitative 
measure of utility and if such a measure were to provide better explanations than 
preference orderings, the path should certainly be followed (Hicks 1945[1939]: 11). He 
agrees with Pareto on this point because they both admit orderings have advantages 
because they preserve explanatory power with lesser costs but should not prevent 
other lines of research in utility theory.
Pareto’s  simplification  meant  a  methodological  improvement  in  consumer  theory. 
Hicks (2001[1956]: 8) identifies this improvement with the reduction of informational 
requirements: in Marshall’s theory in order to determine why a consumer chooses one 
bundle over another, the utility surface must be known; whereas in Pareto’s theory, only 
an indifference map is required. Anyway, with more or less information, the consumer 
model underlying the explanation of the law of demand is still the same: a consumer 
with certain needs buys goods because they give her utility and she spends her 
earnings in order to obtain the greatest possible satisfaction (Hicks 1945 [1939]: 4). 
Hicks explicitly accepts this continuity of utility as unit of meaning: “We have come, 
in some ways, to talk a different language; but the substance of what we have to say, 
(…), is the same as what Marshall said” (Hicks 2001 [1956]: 2) and what Marshall 
had said was still in the lines of Utilitarianism. The different language Hicks refers 
to is ordinality which came to be the standard economic language when Pareto’s 
successors reformulated economic theory exclusively in terms of preference orderings. 
Thus, what has been called the “empiricist motive” does not entail abandoning the 
Utilitarian legacy; it does not mean that utility is discarded as unit of meaning, or 
that economics breaks all its ties with eudemonics. It is rather the confirmation of 
Bentham’s axiom as seen in the enunciative sense of the utility principle, and the 
possibility of grounding it on its manifestations on the market rather than on the 
measurement of mental states.   
In particular, Hicks and R.G.D. Allen (1934a and 1934b) continued this line of research. 
They introduced important changes so as to reformulate all consumer theory in 28
ordinal terms. They presented their work as the extension of Pareto’s in transforming 
“the subjective theory of value into a general logic of choice” (Hicks and Allen 1934a: 
54). Others, as Johnson and Slutsky, also contributed to this reformulation. Most 
scholars recognize the central role of Hicks and Allen’s work, but Stigler (1950b) 
considers Slutsky’s work as a firm step towards giving economics a solid scientific 
basis.  According  to  Stigler  (1950b:  382),  Slutsky  explicitly  intended  to  make 
economics “completely independent of psychological assumptions and philosophical 
hypotheses” . Thus, even if Slutksy “did not deny the interrelations of ‘economic’ utility 
and ‘psychological’ utility” (Stigler 1950b: 382), he tried to give empirical foundations 
to utility theory through an “objective scale of preferences” (Stigler 1950b: 382.). This 
allows Slutksky to eliminate introspection as an element in the theory, avoiding any 
metaphysical implications it could have (Stigler 1950b: 383). However, this does not 
mean that there is no trace of a theory of action in Slutsky, or, in Hands (2009: 638) 
terms of some version of psychology. 
Hands (2010: 638-639) follows others in stating Slutsky’s relation with psychology 
was not as clear as he or, for example, Stigler would affirm. Slutsky does not sever all 
connection with psychic phenomena because he believes a complete notion of utility 
cannot do without its psychological aspect (as quoted in Hands 2010: 638). Even his 
technical analysis of the problem, and new information about what he considered 
to be the philosophical foundations of his theory seems to carry over this influence, 
leading  Hands  (2010:  639)  to  conclude:  “Slutsky’s  views  of  the  foundations  of 
consumer choice theory seem to be much more indebted to mental state psychology 
than suggested by the standard ordinalist-empiricist caricature.” 
In spite of some differences among these economists they all strived at explaining 
the law of demand without utility, understood as a result of introspection, as unit of 
construction. They all believed this was the way to free economics from less than 
scientific psychological or metaphysical reasoning. However, the basic description 
remained: agents try to maximize their utility on the market. Even if utility is an 
ordinal concept, the consumer’s action is still thought of as the result of the pursuit 
of desires, satisfaction, pleasure or utility which can be observed in the agent’s 
choices. The ordinalist revision might have removed utility as unit of construction, 
making any direct or indirect measure unnecessary, but it kept utility as its unit of 
meaning. According to Stigler (1950b: 393-396), economists preserved utility theory, 
even if they tried to reform it, because of its generality and manageability. Even if its 
congruence with reality was more troublesome, they still sustained that anecdotic 
evidence and even introspection (!) would do the trick32. 
6.  Revealed preferences
Pareto and his successors seemed to have solved the problem of the incommensurability 
of utility and with it one of the most controversial topics in economic theory. However, 
according to Paul Samuelson, the ordinalist revision did not solve the whole problem 
32  In the last section we will see how this anecdotic information is being tested and proved, reinstating 
utility as unit of construction.29
because it did not eliminate all metaphysical and psychological residues inherited 
from utilitarianism:
“Hence, despite the fact that the notion of utility has been repudiated or ignored 
by modern theory, it is clear that much of even the most modern analysis shows 
vestigial traces of the utility concept.” (Samuelson 1938a: 61-62)
Samuelson’s  dissatisfaction  with  economic  theory  has  nothing  to  do  with  its 
explanatory capacity; he regrets its lack of empirical foundations. He undertakes the 
re-elaboration of the principles of economic theory in order to give them clear empirical 
support (Samuelson 1938a: 62). Samuelson believes economic science, if it is to be 
truly a science, cannot explain behavior in terms of the pursuit of utility because 
this explanation relies on introspection and not on empirical evidence (Samuelson 
1938a: 62). Therefore, the behavioral model must abandon all psychological and 
metaphysical conjectures and proceed from the observation of uncontrolled actions 
on the market (Samuelson 1938a: 71). For Samuelson any approach that does not 
correspond to such factual evidence must be rejected because it preserves the 
interpretative bias that should be banished from economic theory. 
As we have seen this goal was not particular to Samuelson. Most of the discussion 
among economists, at least since Jevons, had turned around the scientific status 
of economics and its need to rely on purely empirical and observable data. Jevons, 
Edgeworth and Pareto had already stated that in order to eliminate introspection, 
attention should be turned to choice. Therefore, instead of assuming that pleasure 
leads to preferences and preferences to choice, the relation between these terms 
could be inversed establishing that choices reflected preferences associated with 
greater pleasure and less pain. Thus, choice was the result of a utility calculation 
tending to achieve maximum well-being. Even if the motivation of economic action 
was not part of the study of economics, calculating individuals striving at maximizing 
well-being,  remained  the  cornerstone  of  economic  theory.  This  interpretation 
questions the originality of Samuelson’s contribution, and rather presents it as a 
technical solution, or mathematical sophistication if you will, of possibilities present 
since Bentham. 
Samuelson’s first step in his attempt to give empirical grounds to economic theory is 
his WARP. According to this theorem, if an individual chooses bundle A over bundle 
B, she cannot choose at the same time bundle B over bundle A (Samuelson 1938a: 
65). Using this weak theorem, Samuelson is able to reproduce the principal results of 
ordinalist utility theory and the consumer’s reaction to a set of prices and earnings. 
The theorem also allows determining demand functions only in terms of observed 
variables  (i.e.  prices,  quantities  and  income).  Houthakker  (1950)  extended  the 
results of the WARP to situations with n goods, establishing the strong theorem of 
revealed preferences. The theorems of revealed preferences were presented as the 
final liberating device of economic theory from the psychological and metaphysical 
residues of utilitarianism.30
However, Sen (1973) showed that the consistency of the WARP cannot be empirically 
corroborated. It is true that the theorem postulates a single criterion for consistency 
in consumer decisions33 but its strength does not come from its empirical verification. 
Actually, it comes from its intuitive plausibility: knowing my own structure of behavior 
I assume others proceed in the same manner (Sen 1973: 243). Sen points to the 
impossible task of verifying the theorem because it would have to be proved for every 
decision taken in the market in any scenario of price and incomes (Sen 1973: 243). Thus 
the theorem stands as a hypothetical truth whose validity is really given by introspection 
and generalized because of its common acceptance. Just as the utility principle. 
Samuelson’s attempt fails: when an individual decides not to choose one bundle 
over another the criterion used might not be Samuelson’s but that of asymmetrical 
preferences (Wong 2006 [1978]: 58), that is, a bundle cannot be at the same time in a 
higher and in a lower indifference curve than the bundle it is being compared to (Wong 
2006 [1978]: 58). The theorem of revealed preferences still relies on indifference 
curves, inserting it in the theory it was supposed to overcome. Samuelson does 
not replace the ordinalist theory of utility34, rather he contributes to “bolstering [its] 
scientific credentials” (Hands 2010: 643).  
The history of microeconomic theory, based on a theory of action explaining rational 
choice, from Jevons to Samuelson and Houthakker shows that the utilitarian model of 
human behavior has played a major role in building this theory. This is more than saying 
there has been a permanent link between economics and mental state psychology 
because Bentham formulates his theory of action as the foundation of eudemonics, 
an all-encompassing knowledge with positive and normative implications. In spite of 
the explicit rejection of some of the actors of this history we can still trace the rational 
choice description of human behavior back to Bentham’s enunciative sense of his 
utility principle. The theory of action on which rational choice theory relies seems to 
be utilitarian, at least until the first half of the XXth century.  
7.  Where are we now?
The utility language is still widely used in most of economic theory, in particular 
in the theory of rational choice, and its users consider it has no association with 
Utilitarianism. “[E]conomists have tended to withdraw to an alternative position, in 
which the assumption of the maximizing consumer is largely deprived of empirical 
content, though the old terminology, …, is frequently retained” (Knox 2005: 384). One 
example may illustrate this situation. In the chapter Rationality of their book, Hausman 
and  McPherson  (2006)  state  a  position  they  had  already  sustained  elsewhere   
 
33   “If this [the second batch] cost less than or equal to the actual expenditure in the first period when 
the first batch of goods was actually bought, then it means that the individual could have purchased 
the second batch of goods with the price and income of the first situation, but did not choose to do 
so.” (Samuelson, 1938a: 61-62).
34   The theorem of revealed preferences seems then theoretically unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the 
increasing acceptance of bounded rationality, as a general situation in economic decision making, 
has undermined economists’ reliance on revealed preferences because in such situations “choices 
do not necessarily reflect true preferences” (Kahneman and Krueger 2006: 4).31
depicting the current belief in most of economic theory. According to these authors 
the RCT is based on what they call folk psychology (Hausman and McPherson 2006: 
45). According to this folk psychology RCT explains individual actions as the result of 
the agent’s beliefs and motivational factors which are not reduced to seeking pleasure 
and avoiding pain. This “wide array of motivational factors” should then differentiate 
between this folk psychology and Utilitarianism. However, individuals are still believed 
to act motivated primarily by their wants, represented by their preferences alleged 
to be different from their desires (Hausman and McPherson 2006: 45)35. Besides, 
according to the authors, rational choice theory does not need to inquire into the 
reasons why agents prefer something (Hausman and McPherson 2006: 46). 
All these elements sum up to the following description of rational behavior:
“Maximizing utility is just doing what one most prefers to do. Although the utility 
language was inherited from the utilitarians –some of whom thought of utility as a 
sensation with a certain intensity, duration, purity, or ‘propinquity’ (Bentham 1789, 
ch.4) – there is no such implication in contemporary theory. To speak of individuals as 
‘aiming to maximize’ utility or as ‘seeking more’ utility may misleadingly suggest that 
utility is an object of choice, some good thing that people want in addition to healthy 
children, lower taxes, or kiwi fruit. But the theory of rational choice says nothing about 
what people want” (Hausman and McPherson 2006: 49, italics in the original).
This  long  quote  reminds  us  that  in  RCT  utility  is  to  be  understood  only  as  a 
mathematical function. Just as Hicks and Allen (1934b: 196) had already stated, the 
utility function can only serve as an index. Be it ordinal or cardinal, utility has no 
meaning in itself. This absence of meaning marks the difference between what has 
come to be known as experienced utility and decision utility (Kahneman et.al. 1997, 
Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Utilitarianism would be associated with the former and 
RCT with the latter. According to Kahneman and Thaler (2006: 221-2), experience 
utility has to do with a “hedonic experience associated with an outcome” and answers 
the question “do people choose the options they enjoy most?” whereas the question 
behind decision utility is “are preferences consistent with each other and with the 
axioms of rational choice” (Kahneman and Thaler 2006: 221-2.). Bentham and most 
of XIXth century economists used experienced utility and it was gradually abandoned 
and substituted with decision utility (Kahneman et.al. 1997: 372).
The passage from one concept to the other is due to the two features of experienced 
utility (Kahneman et.al. 1997: 372) outlined along this paper: The first one is that 
“subjective hedonic experience cannot be observed or measured” , and the second 
that “choices provide all necessary information about the utility of outcomes because 
35   As Sekerler (2007: 6-7) remarks this difference between preferences and desires switched attention 
from utility maximizing behavior to an analysis in terms of preference relations. Thus, utility as a “psy-
chophysical entity” was replaced with a “more abstract mathematical ‘index of preferences’” (Bruni 
and Guala 2001: 22). The change, as Sekerler documents, introduced with Arrow’s (1951) work and 
developed by Debreu (1954) has a technical character that leaves the question about the meaning 
of utility unsolved. The redefinition of utility makes no reference to motivations as if this sole move 
could break completely from utilitarianism (c.f. Riley 2008).32
rational agents who wish to do so will optimize their hedonic experience” . We have 
followed the different answers economists have tried to give to these problems at 
least up to the revealed preferences theorem. In all cases, the solutions have kept 
traces of Utilitarianism or, using its modern name, experienced utility, showing the 
separation between Utilitiarianism and RCT is less evident than Kahneman and his 
co-authors suggest. 
In the last decade there has been a revival of experienced utility (Kahneman et.al. 
1997: 372) in the line of Bentham, Edgeworth or Marshall who understood it as a 
“continuous hedonic flow of pleasures and pain” (Kahneman and Krueger 2006: 4)36. 
This revival also follows Mill and Jevons because it limits the applicability of the theory 
to certain domains (Kahneman et. al. 1997: 377). However, it does not necessarily 
provide empirical evidence for the enunciative sense of the utility principle because 
it has been reported that experienced utility as a motive for action does not lead to 
maximization of utility or hedonic experience (Kahneman et. al. 1997: 381)37.
These relatively new explorations are also a return to cardinal utility, where the close 
interaction with psychology, as is the case in some studies in experimental economics38, 
provides objective measures of hedonic experience39. This could eventually lead to 
interpersonal comparisons of utility (Kahneman et. al. 1997: 380, 383) and, maybe, 
even to giving an answer to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem or, in more Benthamite 
terms, to introducing the censorial sense of the utility principle into RCT.
In this light the developments in �ew Behavioral Economics seem less new. The 
relationship between economics and psychology was never truly dissolved (Bruni & 
Sugden 2007, Hands 2010, 2011; Heukelom 2008, 2010), and it reveals the strong 
Utilitarian legacy of RCT.
 
 
36  Kahneman and Krueger (2006) argue this revival dates from the second half of the 1990’s with the 
explosion of subjective data information and subjective well-being measures, partly, as a response 
to dissatisfaction with revealed preferences and the rise of bounded rationality. �ote that Kahneman 
and his co-authors explicitly identify a tradition of thought going back to Bentham. Stigler (1950a: 
317) also asserts this tradition was dominant in the early developments of utility theory: “Without 
exception, the founders accepted the existence of utility as a fact of common experience, congruent 
with the most casual introspection” . 
37  In fact, reported experiences seem to show that individuals maximize their remembered utility rather 
than their instant or present utility (Kahneman et al. 1997: 385-6). The authors consider this a posi-
tive result because it shows that “the statement that decisions maximize utility is not a tautology; it 
can be proved false” (Kahneman et al. 1997: 388), which, following Popperian epistemology, would 
reinstate the scientific character of the statement.  Also, as regards Bentham’s utility dimensions, 
duration seems to play no role on individuals’ report of experienced utility (Kahneman et al.: p.381).
38  The influence of this line of investigation goes beyond experimental economics and has made its 
way into mainstream economics as illustrated, for example, in the paper by L. Rayo and G. Becker 
(2007) “Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness” where the authors present “happiness as a biologi-
cal measurement instrument that guides the agent’s decisions” (Rayo and Becker 2007: 327) that 
can be assimilated or compared to an incentive scheme. 
39  A direct consequence is that hedonic experiences no longer rely exclusively on introspection which gave 
them the metaphysical character economists rejected as unscientific (Kahneman et. al. 1997: 395).33
8.  Concluding Remarks
Bentham’s Utilitarianism should be understood, as he intended, as eudemonics: the 
art and science of well-being, and the meeting point of all knowledge. Such view 
highlights its building block, the utility principle, instead of its normative conclusion, 
the  greatest  happiness  principle.  The  utility  principle,  in  its  enunciative  sense, 
contains a theory of action implying an explanation of choice as intended to achieve 
maximum well-being. This theory of action relies in the double sense of utility as a 
relation between the individual and an object, leading to subjective value, and as a 
description and guide of human action, defining its purpose. This theory does not rely 
on introspection, and as psycophysics advances, establishes a link between mental 
states and physical phenomena. 
This presentation of Bentham’s Utilitarianism allows assessing under a new light its 
legacy in marginalism, ordinalism and RCT. In particular, it shows that the changes 
introduced by the Ordinalist Revolution and the WARP are methodological changes 
rather  than  conceptual  ones.  Even  if  Johnson,  Slutksy,  Hicks  and Allen  always 
recognized  this  was  precisely  their  goal,  Samuelson  aimed  at  transforming  the 
postulates of economic theory. His project failed on two accounts: on the one hand, 
he could not provide an observable criterion of rationality; and, on the other, his 
rationality criterion ended up within the same maximizing utility structure he intended 
to abandon. The simplicity and economy with which he obtained his results have 
been highly valued but he did not offer new empirical grounds for economic theory.
Thus, in spite of economists’ systematic attempts at disconnecting economic theory 
from Utilitiarianism, at least in the enunciative sense of the utility principle, utilitarian 
rationality remains as the unit of meaning of economic action. And nowadays, not 
only does it remain, it is being vindicated. In order to account for agents’ market 
decisions, as Marshall insisted, their choices, that is, their preferences, must be 
explained. The explanations the first marginalists offered were given in terms of utility: 
agents choose as they do because their choice gives them more utility or well-being. 
Even if cardinality was replaced with preference orderings, which made measure 
unnecessary, the meaning of the action is still the pursuit of well-being. In this sense, 
utility, ophelimity, desirability or wantability all convey the same basic idea and the 
same technical consequence for economic theory: the value of an object is given by 
its potential capacity to satisfy an individual’s needs, desires or wants independently 
of their practical use or ethical connotations (cf. Fisher 1918). 
It is of the philosophical connotations that economists seem unaware: such unit of 
meaning of human action reduces problems and rationality criteria to calculations. 
Even if most economists have been very careful and have stressed the need of 
limiting the use of such unit of meaning only to human action, its founder and others 
have seen its explanatory potential in other social realms (cf. Hurtado (2008)). 
In conclusion, the explanation that still underlies the behavioral model of economic 
theory and particularly of RCT draws its meaning from the pursuit of utility. Any action 34
that cannot be described as responding to such a motivation is still an action that 
economic theory cannot think. If economics is to be a theory of action it needs a 
psychological theory, an anthropological philosophy, a conception of human behavior. 
This brings Utilitarianism back to the fore and asks for a renewed appraisal of its 
implications in positive as well as in normative economics. 35
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